In this work, the concept of common sense in Karl Popper’s epistemology is presented and discussed. In the first part, the role that the common sense plays in the Popperian falsacionist methodology is shown. In the second part, an interpretation of the common sense is proposed based on the evolut..

En esta discusión abordo la hermenéutica analógica de Mauricio Beuchot comparándola con la hermenéutica filosófica de Hans-Georg Gadamer. Argumento que Beuchot vuelve a la idea clásica de la hermenéutica como método de interpretación y no la juzga, como Gadamer, como una fenomenología de la comprensión. Sin embargo, Beuchot no atiende las razones de Gadamer en contra de concebir la hermenéutica como una metodología. Si se considera como metodología centrada en la analogía, la hermenéutica analógica deja de lado otros recursos interpretativos (...) importantes. Finalmente, Beuchot adopta una teoría correspondentista de la verdad contra la que argumenta Gadamer y que es incompatible con una hermenéutica filosófica. In this paper I analyze Mauricio Beuchot's analogical hermeneutics by contrasting it with Hans-Georg Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics. I argue that Beuchot goes back to the classical idea of hermeneutics as a method of interpretation, and does not see it, as Gadamer does, as a phenomenology of understanding. However, Beuchot does not address Gadamer's arguments against using hermeneutics as a methodology. Considered as a methodology centered on analogy, analogical hermeneutics overlooks other important interpretation resources. Finally, Beuchot adopts a correspondence theory of truth, which Gadamer objects and is incompatible with philosophical hermeneutics. (shrink)

Pocas veces ha habido mayor afinidad entre un filósofo y un científico. Este libro (de 191 páginas) descubre cómo Julián Marías conoció a Jérôme Lejeune en 1980, y ambos resultan muy afines: los dos afirman la unicidad (calidad de único) de cada persona, algo que durante la Edad Media se reservaba a muy pocos seres de este mundo: el Sol, la Luna o la Tierra, pero no se aplicaba a cada persona, considerada como miembro de una especie única porque (...) se creía que su principio de individuación era la materia señalada por la cantidad (estos huesos y esta carne, no agotados en cada individuo). Además, se consideraba que solo había persona cuarenta días después de la concepción en el caso del varón, y noventa en el caso de la mujer. El presente libro (que traduce por primera vez al español algunos textos en francés tanto de Lejeune como de Marías y que parte de la genética moderna descubierta por Lejeune, así como de la metafísica de Marías, la cual considera "mi vida" como la realidad radical) muestra cómo estos dos grandes humanistas supieron ir a contracorriente, usando la razón y la ciencia, para proteger al no nacido. Índice: Un filósofo y un científico ante el aborto- Angustia ante la monstruosidad- Lo más grave que ha ocurrido en el siglo XX- Deshumanización- Diversas hipocresías- El caso de Jérôme Lejeune- El informe que Marías le pidió a Lejeune- Del cigoto a Pulgarcito- Unicidad desde la concepción- Teoría de la animación retardada- «Yo soy yo y mi circunstancia»- La nueva metafísica- De las “cosas” a la “persona”- De la “naturaleza” al “hombre”- De la “sustancia” al “hacerse”- De la “materia signata” a las “experiencias radicales”- Del “qué” o “algo” al “quién” o “alguien”- Del “algo corporal” al “alguien corporal”- Del “embrión” a la “criatura”- Del “aborto” a la “perduración”- Del “parecer” a la “verdad”-. (shrink)

I argue that if there are nondisabled reasons to believe p, then there cannot be nondisabled reasons to believe something incompatible with p. I first defend a restricted version of the view, which applies only to situations where the relevant agent has complete evidence. Then, I argue for a generalized version of the view, which holds regardless of the agent's evidence. As a related result, I show that, given plausible assumptions, there cannot be nondisabled reasons to believe something false.

Are norms of inquiry in tension with epistemic norms? I provide a (largely) negative answer, turning to a picture of epistemic practices as rule-governed games. The idea is that, while epistemic norms are correctness standards for the attitudes involved in epistemic games, norms of inquiry derive from the aims of those games. Attitudes that, despite being epistemically correct, are inadvisable regarding the goals of some inquiry are just like bad (but legal) moves in basketball or chess. I further consider cases (...) in which the aims of inquiry recommend breaking epistemic norms. I compare them to strategic infractions, which are common in many coherent games. Finally, I explore the connections between rules and aims in games and in inquiry. I show that in both cases respecting the rules is constitutively required for satisfying the aims of the practice. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to present the principles of intersubjectivity as a second-person relational account of mind, set against individualist first- and third-person accounts of the sharing of mental representations. I will set out a summary of these positions and defend the claim that understanding proto-conversations as “expressive communications” allows one to understand them as genuine communications, as in, mutually manifest communications that entail intersubjectivity. To support this interpretation, I will propose a novel explanation of expression, understood as (...) constitutive of the mental state. (shrink)

RESUMEN Giorgio Agamben ha caracterizado las reglas monásticas como la constitución de una forma de vida en que -más allá de la ley- la regla y la vida se tornan indiscernibles. En este artículo asumimos la invitación de Agamben a trazar la historia semántica del léxico de la regla y nos preguntamos qué ocurrió cuando, en la primera Modernidad, las reglas se extrapolaron a la trama completa del mundo de vida, como ocurrió en la espiritualidad metódica de protestantes y jesuitas. (...) A través del análisis de uno de los géneros de discurso que ilustra el encuadramiento normativo de las prácticas modernas en ambientes protestantes y jesuitas, los libros barrocos de regu-lae, caracterizamos cierto régimen discursivo y semiótico que sirvió de marco para el pensamiento metódico moderno y su racionalismo analítico. ABSTRACT Giorgio Agamben has characterized the monastic rules as the constitution of a way of life in which -beyond the law- the rule and the life become indiscernible. In this article we accept the invitation of Agamben to trace the semantic history of the lexicon of the rule and we wonder what happened when, in the first Modernity, the rules were extrapolated to the complete plot of the world of life, as in the methodical spirituality of Protestants and Jesuits. Through the analysis of one genre of discourse that illustrates the normative framing of modern practices in Protestant and Jesuit environments, the baroque books of regulae, we characterize a certain discursive and semiotic regime that served as a framework for modern methodical thought and its analytical rationalism. (shrink)

Resumen En el pensamiento contemporáneo, el relato de Babel ha suscitado alegatos teológicos contra los proyectos titánicos del racionalismo moderno y exégesis poéticas en defensa de la diseminación idiomática. Los dos ensayos de Michael Oakeshott titulados “La Torre de Babel” permiten reconocer las principales inquietudes intelectuales del autor y los diferentes dilemas teóricos en la comprensión del Estado europeo moderno. No solo escenifican el aspecto ruinoso del racionalismo moral y el utopismo político, sino también los riesgos de la política de (...) la fe, del colectivismo, y de la reducción de las asociaciones humanas a transacciones instrumentales o corporaciones empresariales. En la exégesis de Oakeshott, Babel se perfila como un mito político moderno, que exhibe una marcada ambivalencia mediante la convergencia de motivos éticos, religiosos, políticos e, incluso, poéticos.In contemporary thought, the story of Babel has raised theological arguments against the titanic projects of modern rationalism and poetic exegesis in defense of idiomatic dissemination. The two essays by Michael Oakeshott entitled "The Tower of Babel" allow to recognize the main intellectual concerns of the author and the different theoretical dilemmas in the understanding of the modern European State. They not only illustrate the ruinous aspect of moral rationalism and political utopianism, but also the risks of the politics of faith, of collectivism, and of the reduction of human associations to instrumental transactions or enterprise corporations. In the exegesis of Oakeshott, Babel emerges as a modern political myth, showing a marked ambivalence through the convergence of ethical, religious, political, and even poetic motives. (shrink)

La creación de imágenes científicas es uno de los ámbitos más activos dentro de la cultura visual. Este artículo describe, en su primera parte, las cuatro dimensiones principales de la imagen científica (las dimensiones cognitiva, constructiva, pragmática y estética), para poner el énfasis al final de su descripción en la presente convergencia de la ciencia y del arte. En su segunda parte analiza un conocido caso de imagen paracientífica actual, donde a través de una específica combinación de dichas cuatro dimensiones (...) comparecen ejemplarmente buen número de las obsesiones a la vez epistémicas y políticas de la contemporaneidad. (shrink)

Higher‐order evidence can make an agent doubt the reliability of her reasoning. When this happens, it seems rational for the agent to adopt a cautious attitude towards her original conclusion, even in cases where the higher‐order evidence is misleading and the agent's original reasons were actually perfectly good. One may think that recoiling to a cautious attitude in the face of misleading self‐doubt involves a failure to properly respond to one's reasons. My aim is to show that this is not (...) so. My proposal is that (misleading) higher‐order evidence can undermine the agent's possession of her first‐order reasons, constituting what I call a dispossessing defeater. After acquiring the higher‐order evidence, the agent is no longer in a position to rely competently on the relevant first‐order considerations as reasons for her original conclusion, so that such reasons stop being available to her (even if they remain as strong as in the absence of the higher‐order evidence). In this way, an agent with misleading higher‐order evidence can adopt a cautious stance towards her original conclusion, while properly responding to the set of reasons that she possesses–a set that is reduced due to the acquisition of higher‐order dispossessing defeaters. (shrink)

¿Qué entendemos cuando hablamos de eutanasia? Etimológicamente, el término procede de las raíces griegas eu (bueno, buena) y thanatos (muerte). Sin embargo, una definición etimológica parece insuficiente, ya que la noción que se tiene de tal concepto ha variado a través de la historia, así como su misma práctica.Para comprender el por qué no se ha podido establecer un consenso acerca de lo que se entiende por eutanasia, podría ser útil mencionar algunas culturas y sus prácticas del “buen morir”. Ciertas (...) culturas nómadas, por ejemplo, dejaban atrás a enfermos y ancianos. Los espartanos abandonaban en la corriente de un río a los recién nacidos en caso de que éstos tuviesen alguna deformidad o poca probabilidad de seguir viviendo. En el mismo caso, los romanos los dejaban morir en la intemperie. Entre los battaki, es una práctica común que el padre de familia, ya viejo, suba a un árbol, y simbolizando un fruto maduro, se deje caer; posteriormente, sus familiares lo matan y se lo comen.Ahora bien, ¿cuál es la intuición que parecen tener estas culturas acerca de una muerte causada pero no mal intencionada? En principio, podríanse juzgar tales prácticas como inmorales e inhumanas, pero eso sería cometer imprecisiones contextuales acerca del carácter histórico y moral de tales actividades. La correspondencia más clara entre tales culturas y su concepción del final de la vida se muestra en pos de un respeto y aceptación de la muerte, es decir, una conciencia de la inevitabilidad de la muerte y nuestro artículo versa sobre todo ello. (shrink)

El presente artículo describe un proyecto de innovación educativa de aprendizaje de competencias, realizado en el Curso Propio de Liderazgo de la Universidad San Pablo CEU, transversal a toda su oferta educativa. Se trata de nuevo proyecto basa- do en una docencia híbrida, donde las masterclass más teóricas se han complemen- tado con un aprendizaje basado en retos vinculados a materias de comunicación y sostenibilidad, aplicando la metodología Design Sprint. De esta forma, se consigue formar al alumno en las llamadas (...) habilidades blandas, cada vez más demandadas por el entorno laboral. (shrink)

It is widely held that there is a distinctive norm of assertion. A plausible idea is that there is an analogous, perhaps weaker, norm for indirect communication via implicatures. I argue against this type of proposal. My claim is that the norm of assertion is a social norm governing public updates to the conversational record. Off the record implicatures are not subject to social norms of this type. I grant that, as happens in general with intentional actions, off the record (...) communicative acts may be subject to normative assessments on different levels (for instance, regarding their moral or prudential appropriateness). However, such assessments do not generate distinctive norms that apply to all cases of implicature. (shrink)

Teleosemantic theories aspire to develop a naturalistic account of intentional agency and thought by appeal to biological teleology. In particular, most versions of teleosemantics study the emergence of intentionality in terms of biological purposes introduced by Darwinian evolution. The aim of this paper is to argue that the sorts of biological purposes identified by these evolutionary approaches do not allow for a satisfactory account of intentionality. More precisely, I claim that such biological purposes should be attributed to reproductive chains or (...) lineages, rather than to individual traits or organisms, whereas the purposes underlying intentional agency and thought are typically attributed to individuals. In the last part of the paper I suggest that related difficulties are also faced, despite appearances, by accounts of intentionality relying on alternative organizational approaches to biological teleology. (shrink)

En el debate contemporáneo sobre el sentido crítico de la modernidad resulta frecuente la invocación de una autoconcepción filosófica comprehensiva de la tarea crítica como conciencia reflexiva y universal o como libre autotransformación existencial. Por medio de una reconstrucción interpretativa de algunas actitudes, prácticas y discursos críticos en el pensamiento renacentista hispano, este artículo se propone reivindicar la importancia de las diferentes tradiciones críticas que sirven de trasfondo para el juicio crítico inmanente y situado. En el Renacimiento hispano conviven discursos (...) críticos tan distintos como la crítica histórico-filológica humanista, la naturalización del juicio crítico, el diálogo heterodoxo y el cuestionamiento crítico intercultural. Dado el carácter multiforme y situado de las tradiciones críticas modernas, cabe concluir que no tiene mucho sustento la autoconcepción filosófica de la modernidad como una era de la crítica basada en la autoconciencia reflexiva transparente, o bien en el ejercicio de una sospecha ilimitada. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Anti-normativists have advanced the view that the involvement of content in norms is not an essential feature of content, but a contingent feature or side effect of the normativity governing attitudes. In this paper, we argue that, in its original formulation, this view puts too much weight on the idea that belief is the fundamental, and perhaps the only, source of content-involving normativity. In its more refined formulation, however, the view does not make justice to a neutral and encompassing (...) characterization of what it is for content to be essentially normative. (shrink)

El presente artículo aborda las connotaciones y los fundamentos de la paráfrasis cum canere vellem en Serv. Ecl. 6. 3. El análisis del sentido del verbo volo en este contexto y la confrontación del pasaje con Serv. Ecl. 6. 5 revelan que Servio interpreta la frase cum canerem reges et proelia como referencia a un temprano empeño de Virgilio en componer poesía épica, del que pronto desistió. Esta interpretación está condicionada por la idea de que la secuencia cronológica Églogas - (...) Geórgicas - Eneida tiene un correlato jerárquico, idea que se funda en noticias biográficas y en la teoría de la tripertita varietas. This paper focuses on the connotations and grounds of the paraphrase cum canere vellem in Serv. Ecl. 6. 3. The analysis of the sense of verb volo within this context, as well as the confrontation between that passage and Serv. Ecl. 6. 5, show that Servius interprets the clause cum canerem reges et proelia as a reference to Virgil's early endeavor to compose an epic poem, from which he shortly desisted. This interpretation is conditioned by the idea that the chronological sequence Eclogues - Georgics - Aeneid has a hierarchical correlate, an idea which is founded on biographical information and the theory of tripertita varietas. (shrink)

Ascriptions of rationality are related to our practices of praising and criticizing. This seems to provide motivation for normative accounts of rationality, more specifically for the view that rationality is a matter of responding to normative reasons. However, rational agents are sometimes guided by false beliefs. This is problematic for those reasons-based accounts of rationality that are also committed to the widespread thesis that normative reasons are facts. The critical aim of the paper is to present objections to recent proposed (...) solutions to this problem, according to which the responses of deceived agents would be rationalized by facts about how things appear to them. My positive aim is to argue that accounts of reasons in terms of apparent reasons manage to capture the intuitions that seem to favor a normative account of rationality. (shrink)

En este artículo se ofrece una reflexión teológica sobre el significado que envuelve la elección de los últimos pontífices de la Iglesia católica que va desde Juan Pablo II, pasando por Benedicto XVI, hasta llegar al actual Papa Francisco. A juicio del autor, esta historia de la Iglesia en el último medio siglo ofrece aspectos sorprendentes que pueden llamarse mutaciones, giros, cambios de curso o vuelcos que incitan a preguntar si se trata de continuidad y de un real acrecentamiento, o (...) por el contrario, de real ruptura; más todavía, surge la pregunta de si ante tales variaciones no estaremos ante un hecho de fondo más grave: que el cristianismo sea un sincretismo en el que todo cabe, capaz por tanto de asumir e integrar aun lo más diverso y contradictorio. This article offers a theological reflection on the meaning surrounding the election of the last popes of the Catholic Church that go from John Paul II, through Benedict XVI, up to the present Pope Francis. According to the author, this story of the Church in the last half century gives striking aspects that can be called mutations, turns, changes of course or rollovers which incite to ask if this is a real continuation and enhancement, or on the contrary, true rupture; or even maybe, whether such variations show a much more serious fact arising in the background: that Christianity is syncretic, a system in which anything fits, thus being able to take and integrate even the most diverse and contradictory ideas. (shrink)

Selected-effects theories provide the most popular account of biological teleology. According to these theories, the purpose of a trait is to do whatever it was selected for. The vast majority of selected-effects theories consider biological teleology to be introduced by natural selection. We want to argue, however, that natural selection is not the only relevant selective process in biology. In particular, our proposal is that biological regulation is a form of biological selection. So, those who accept selected-effects theories should recognize (...) biological regulation as a distinctive source of biological teleology. The purposes derived from biological regulation are of special interest for explaining and predicting the behavior of organisms, given that regulatory mechanisms directly modulate the behavior of the systems they regulate. This explanatory power, added to the fact that regulation is widespread in the biological world, makes the idea that regulation gives rise to its own form of teleology a substantial contribution to the debate on biological teleology. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that defeasible inferences are occasion-sensitive: the inferential connections of a given claim depend on features of the circumstances surrounding the occasion of inference. More specifically, it is an occasion-sensitive matter which possible defeaters have to be considered explicitly by the premises of an inference and which possible defeaters may remain unconsidered, without making the inference enthymematic. As a result, a largely unexplored form of occasion-sensitivity arises in inferentialist theories of content that appeal to defeasible inferences.

En este artículo se analiza una recreación quijotesca en la novela de Graham Greene Monseñor Quijote. Para ello se utilizan dos términos procedentes del Derecho romano: los conceptos de autoridad y poder. En esta obra de Greene, la autoridad surge de los libros o de autores de libros, cuya lectura permite que la vida siga teniendo sentido. En Greene encontramos la estrategia de lectura conocida como las sortes virgilianae que permite a los personajes orientarse en las dificultades diarias. Sin embargo, (...) el poder está caracterizado por su condición iletrada, la ausencia de libros y su ignorancia. In this article a novel by Graham Greene entitled Monsignor Quixote is analysed, a book that involves a recreation of the novel by Cervantes. The author of this article employs two concepts from Roman law: authority and power in his analysis. In this work by Greene, authority arises from the books or the book writers, whose reading allows life to keep making sense. In Greene, a strategy of reading known as the sortes virgilianae is found and this allows the characters to get their bearings in the daily difficulties. However, power is described as illiterate, the absence of books and ignorance. (shrink)

It is often thought that bets on the truth of known propositions become irrational if the losing costs are high enough. This is typically taken to count against the view that knowledge involves assigning credence 1. I argue that the irrationality of such extreme bets can be explained by considering the interactions between the agent and the bookmaker. More specifically, the agent’s epistemic perspective is altered by the fact that the bookmaker proposes that unusual type of bet. Among other things, (...) being willing to offer a bet with unnecessarily harmful losing costs is likely to undermine the baseline level of trustworthiness required for it to be rational to engage in betting exchanges. This sort of explanation does not require granting either that we assign credence lower than 1 to known propositions or that knowledge is sensitive to practical stakes. Moreover, I show that, in our ordinary lives, we frequently perform actions that we know would be disastrous if certain conditions did not obtain. This behaviour can be seen as a form of implicit extreme betting and, nevertheless, it is often rational. (shrink)

Certain dialogism is generally recognized in the founding moments of Western philosophy, and it is possible to see various forms of intertextuality in our philosophical tradition. In spite of certain monological temptations, philosophy is not a self-demonstrative system; it has woven its texts quoting other discursive voices and through the invocation of borrowed words. This article aims to outline a discontinuous overview of quotation rhetorical functions at different moments of Western philosophy. The philosophical quote has contributed to discursive authorization or (...) to provide shared discursive repertoires, but also to invocate other intertextual voices discursive or integrate other texts in the meta-discourse of the philosopher. Nowadays the disciplinary regulation of citation practices and the bibliometric economy of impact indices threaten that dialogic and intertextual legacy. (shrink)

Daniel Whiting has argued, in this journal, that Mark Schroeder’s analysis of knowledge in terms of subjectively and objectively sufficient reasons for belief makes wrong predictions in fake barn cases. Schroeder has replied that this problem may be avoided if one adopts a suitable account of perceptual reasons. I argue that Schroeder’s reply fails to deal with the general worry underlying Whiting’s purported counterexample, because one can construct analogous potential counterexamples that do not involve perceptual reasons at all. Nevertheless, I (...) claim that it is possible to overcome Whiting’s objection, by showing that it rests on an inadequate characterization of how defeat works in the examples in question. (shrink)

We present an inferentialist account of collective rationality and intentionality, according to which beliefs and other intentional states are understood in terms of the normative statuses attributed to, and undertaken by, the participants of a discursive practice—namely, their discursive or practical commitments and entitlements. Although these statuses are instituted by the performances and attitudes of the agents, they are not identified with any physical or psychological entity, process or relation. Therefore, we argue that inferentialism allows us to talk of collective (...) intentionality and agency without needing to posit the existence of any sort of collective psychology or mind. (shrink)